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Individuals reporting high levels of distractibility in everyday life show impaired performance
in standard laboratory tasks measuring selective attention and inhibitory processes. Sim-
ilarly, increasing cognitive load leads to more errors/distraction in a variety of cognitive
tasks. How these two factors interact is currently unclear; highly distractible individuals
may be affected more when their cognitive resources are taxed, or load may linearly affect
performance for all individuals. We investigated the relationship between self-reported
levels of cognitive failures (CF) in daily life and performance in the antisaccade task, a
widely used tool examining attentional control. Levels of concurrent cognitive demand
were manipulated using a secondary auditory discrimination task. We found that both
levels of self-reported CF and task load increased antisaccade latencies while having no
effect on prosaccade eye-movements. However individuals rating themselves as suffering
few daily life distractions showed a comparable load cost to those who experience many.
These ﬁndings suggest that the likelihood of distraction is governed by the addition of both
internal susceptibility and the external current load placed on working memory.
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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive slips and errors are common in daily life, with most
people at one time or another forgetting where they left their car
keys or if they left a light switched on at home. However, some
individuals are more likely to commit such slips than others. The
cognitive failures questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982) is
an established measure of individual differences in daily cogni-
tive slips, with a number of questions relating to everyday errors
such as the likelihood of dropping objects or failing to keep a
task goal in mind.While these kinds of questions might be seen to
reﬂect lapses inmemory, scores on this questionnaire are positively
correlated with increased distraction of attention in a number of
daily life situations: from absentmindedness while shopping (Rea-
son and Lucas, 1984), to an increased number of car accidents
(Larson and Merritt, 1991) and other mishaps or injuries at work
(Wallace and Vodanovich, 2003). Notably, CFQ scores remain rel-
atively constant over time (Broadbent et al., 1982), and spouse
ratings consistently match self-reported scores (Hickox and Sun-
derland, 1992), demonstrating that CFQ is a robust index of daily
life cognitive failures (CF).
In addition to correlates with daily life slips, high CFQ scorers
also show speciﬁc deﬁcits in experimental investigations of atten-
tion and cognitive control. For instance, increased levels of CF
are associated with increased interference in the Eriksen ﬂanker
task and Stroop task (Broadbent et al., 1986; Tipper and Baylis,
1987), and impaired performance when dividing attention (Har-
ris and Wilkins, 1982). Tipper and Baylis (1987) also found that
high CFQ scorers showed no evidence of negative priming or inhi-
bition to distractors while consistent negative priming effects were
seen for low scorers, suggesting that CF may be associated with a
reduced ability to inhibit task-irrelevant information. Importantly,
CFQ scores do not appear to predict performance in memory
tasks (Wilkins and Baddeley, 1978), though they have been noted
to affect memory in tasks requiring the inhibition of unwanted
memories (Groome and Grant, 2005).
One explanation for the relationship between CFQ scores and
poor performance on tasks of selective attention maybe that both
reﬂect a failure to maintain task goals in working memory (WM).
LoadingWM via secondary tasks has been shown to disrupt selec-
tive attention in a similar manner to that reported in the study
of CFQ (see, e.g., Gazzaley, 2011, for review). One paradigm
exemplifying this is the antisaccade task, in which participants
are required to inhibit a prosaccade toward a sudden onset target,
and initiate a saccade toward its mirror image location. Converg-
ing evidence suggests that antisaccade performance is linked to
WMprocesses. For example, participants with lowWMspan show
increased errors (prosaccades toward the target; Unsworth et al.,
2004). Increased errors and increased correct antisaccade laten-
cies are found in populations with known WM deﬁcits, such as
elderly participants, and for ﬁrst-episode schizophrenic patients
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; see Hutton and Ettinger, 2006, for
review). In addition, secondary WM loads such as mental arith-
metic or n-back correspondingly have adverse effects on correct
antisaccade latencies and error rates (e.g.,Roberts et al., 1994;Kane
et al., 2001).
While both internal factors such as personality and external
factors including cognitive load can adversely affect selective atten-
tion, very few investigations have attempted to examine the extent
to which these two factors interact. In daily life, we are required
to perform cognitive tasks that range in difﬁculty, in different
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environments that include varying sources of potential distrac-
tions, from a quiet ofﬁce to driving on a busy road. Though one’s
susceptibility to CF and concurrent cognitive load are separate, in
the real world they are not independent.Are individuals who expe-
rience little distraction in lifemore able to cope in situations where
cognitive resources are taxed by load, and are thosewho experience
manydistractions less able to copewhen situations aremore cogni-
tively demanding? Divided attention tasks provide some evidence
that individuals reporting high levels of CF do suffer more distrac-
tion than low CF reporters, but these tasks tend not to compare
performance across both single and dual-task conditions within
the same experiment (e.g., Harris and Wilkins, 1982).
Accordingly, we investigated the role of both CFQ score and
cognitive load using the antisaccade task. A secondary auditory
task of either low or high load was also employed, requiring either
passive verbal response or more complex pitch discrimination
respectively. A previous investigation using the antisaccade task
found that high CFQ score was correlated with faster antisaccade
latencies but a greater number of errors (Larson and Perry, 1999).
However, this ﬁnding might imply an unusual speed–accuracy
trade-off in high CFQ scorers rather than evidence of a cognitive
efﬁciency deﬁcit, and the experiment also contained a number of
othermethodological concerns (see Discussion).We hypothesized
that high levels of CF would be correlated with increased anti-
saccade latencies in line with previous ﬁndings involving groups
characterized by deﬁcits in cognitive inhibition (e.g., individuals
with high levels of anxiety; Derakshan et al., 2009; see Derakshan
and Eysenck, 2009, for a review). We also predicted that cogni-
tive load would impair antisaccade latencies while not impacting
upon prosaccade latencies. Finally, we examined the effect of load
on both low and high CFQ scorers, while also measuring levels of
state anxiety to ensure stressors did not affect scorers differently.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-two participants (25 female) were recruited via advertise-
ments at the University of London to take part in the exper-
iment (mean age 24.36, range 20–36). Participants had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision. They reported no auditory
impairments.
APPARATUS
Eye-movements were recorded using an SR Research Eyelink 1000
eye-tracker (SR Research, ON, Canada).Only one eye was tracked
during the experiment. Nine-point calibration across the com-
puter screen was used to ensure tracking accuracy was within 1˚
of visual angle. Images were presented on a 21′′ Viewsonic CRT
monitor (140Hz), and a chinrest was used to ensure a constant
viewing distance of 60 cm. The experiment was presented using
the SR Research Experiment Builder software. A separate laptop
played the auditory tones, presented through E-Prime software.
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE
The experiment took place in a dimly lit and sound-protected
room. Prior to the experiment proper, participants completed the
CFQ (Broadbent et al., 1982) in addition to the state version of
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger et al., 1983; also
completed at the end of the experiment). In the main experi-
ment, participants were instructed to look “AT,” or “AWAY” from
a white oval-shaped item appearing on-screen depending on the
block, while also concurrently responding to tones presented in
the background verbally (i.e., low or high load).
Each trial began with a ﬁxation cross (0.95˚× 0.95˚) presented
in the center of the screen for 1000ms. Participantswere instructed
to ﬁxate this cross. If participants ﬁxated the cross between 500 and
1000ms after its onset, the trialmoved forward immediately, acting
as a drift correct to tracking. The oval-shaped target subtending
2.58˚× 4.77˚ then appeared either in the left or right periphery
of the screen for 600ms, at an eccentricity from ﬁxation to the
center of the oval of 11.04˚. In the prosaccade block, participants
were asked tomove their eyes from ﬁxation to the target as quickly
and as accurately as possible. In the antisaccade block, participants
were instructed to move their eyes to the mirror image location as
quickly and as accurately as possible, while trying to avoid looking
toward the target. An inter-trial interval of 1500ms then occurred.
For the secondary task, auditory tones were played in the back-
ground of the room via a laptop. In the high load condition, one
of three tones differing in pitch was randomly presented every
1900–2300ms (ﬁve choices of 100ms increments). Participants
were asked to respond with “low,” “mid,” or “high” depending on
the pitch, while concurrently performing anti- and prosaccades.
In the low load condition, participants were asked to simply say
the word “tone” whenever one was played. Only the mid tones
were used during this block, to ensure that participants did not
implicitly discriminate the tone pitch despite not being required
to. The experimenter informed the participant at the start of each
block what combination of “AT”/“AWAY” and “TONE”/“PITCH”
they would be conducting. The experimenter started the tones
at the same time as the participant pressed the escape key on
the keyboard to begin the block, and stopped the auditory tones
when ablock ended.The experimentermonitored the participants’
performance and prompted them if they made errors in the dis-
crimination. Good speed and accuracy was emphasized for both
tasks.
Participants were given initial practice at distinguishing the
tones, along with 16 practice trials for anti/prosaccades. The main
experiment consisted of 8 blocks of 36 trials (two blocks for each
condition), and block order was counterbalanced across partici-
pants. Participants were thanked, debriefed, and paid £5 for their
contribution, at the end of the experiment.
RESULTS
The data for 34 participants were used in the analysis1. Trials in
which no saccade was made, or trials in which a saccade was made
in under 80ms (anticipatory saccade; see Fischer et al., 1993) were
excluded from analysis. This led to an average of 6.04% of trials
being removed (no effects of CF group on percentage of trials
removed were observed). Median CFQ score for the entire sam-
ple was 42 (SD= 13.36). Participants were divided based on the
median split as either low (N = 17) or high scorers (N = 17).
The two groups’ scores signiﬁcantly differed from each other
1Data from eight participants were removed either for the percentage of excluded
trials being above 40% or for error rates of over 50%.
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[Med= 30.41 vs. 52.29; t (32)= 8.47,p< 0.001].Additionally, par-
ticipants’ self-reports of state anxiety before and after the experi-
mentwere averaged to obtain a composite single state anxiety score
reﬂecting levels of state anxiety during the experimental session.
In this respect mean state anxiety for the entire sample was 36.51
(SD= 7.84).
RESPONSE LATENCIES
Response latency was analyzed only for correct trials. A 2 (Load:
low, high)× 2 (Task: Prosaccade, Antisaccade)× 2 (Group: low
CF, high CF) mixed ANOVA was conducted on median laten-
cies, with the means of individual median scores reported herein.
This revealed a trend for a main effect of Load [F(1,32)= 3.56,
p = 0.07] and a signiﬁcant effect of Task [F(1,32)= 228.8,
p< 0.001]. Participants were moderately slower under high load
compared to low load (low load: M = 221, SD= 33; high load:
M = 228, SD= 38), while also much slower on antisaccade
(M = 270, SD= 47) vs. prosaccade trials (M = 178, SD= 29).
Importantly, there was a signiﬁcant Load×Task interaction
[F(1,32)= 9.75, p< 0.005] with load signiﬁcantly increasing anti-
saccade response latencies [t (33)= 3.48, p = 0.001; low load:
M = 262, SD= 48; high load:M = 279, SD= 51], while having no
effect on prosaccade latencies (t < 1; low load: M = 179, SD= 31;
high load: M = 176, SD= 33).
Effects of CFQ scores and state anxiety
While no main effect of Group was observed [F(1,32)= 2.2,
p = 0.15], a signiﬁcant Task×Group interaction [F(1,32)= 4.08,
p = 0.05] was found. To assess this relationship further, we
employed correlational analysis on each condition using CFQ
score as a continuous variable. There was a positive relationship
between CFQ scores and antisaccade latencies, r = 0.411, p = 0.01
(see Figure 1), and this relationship was signiﬁcant for both low
(r = 0.439, p< 0.01) and high cognitive load (r = 0.352, p< 0.05)
conditions. The two correlation coefﬁcients did not differ sig-
niﬁcantly from each other (Z = 0.41, p = 0.68) Meanwhile, no
signiﬁcant correlation was found with prosaccade latencies under
low, r = 0.03, or high cognitive load, r = 0.13, p’s> 0.1. Finally,
Group did not signiﬁcantly interact with Load or Load and Task
together (F ’s< 1); load cost speciﬁcally on antisaccade latencies
was comparable when examining CF groups separately (low CF:
M diff = 26ms, SD= 35; high CF: M diff = 14ms, SD= 39).
Self-reported state anxiety correlated with CFQ scores
(r = 0.397, p< 0.03; see Figure 2), while showing amoderate rela-
tionship also with antisaccade latencies (r = 0.33, p = 0.055). A
hierarchical regression analysis was performed with CFQ scores
entered on Step 1 and state anxiety on Step 2, to examine if
state anxiety explained additional variance in antisaccade laten-
cies after allowing for the main contributing effect of CFQ scores.
State anxiety did not signiﬁcantly predict AS latencies (unstan-
dardized β= 1.19, SE β= 1.04, t = 1.14, p = 0.24), after allowing
for the effect of CFQ scores (unstandardized β= 1.44, SE β= 0.56,
t = 2.55, p< 0.02).
ERROR RATES
Errors were deﬁned as saccades either to the oval target when
participants were instructed to look away, or saccades away from
FIGURE 1 | Relationship between CFQ scores and antisaccade
latencies (collapsed across load).
FIGURE 2 | Relationship between CFQ scores and state anxiety.
the target when instructed to look at it. A 2 (Task; Antisac-
cade, Prosaccade)× (Load: low, high)× 2 (Group: low CF, high
CF) mixed ANOVA assessed reﬂexive errors (antisaccade trials)
and possible incorrect inhibition (prosaccade trials) as percent-
ages of the total number of trials. Analysis revealed a main effect
of Load, F(1,32)= 88.92, p< 0.001, and a main effect of Task,
F(1,32)= 4.7, p< 0.05. Participantsmademore errors under high
load (M = 13.99, SD= 7.69) compared to low load (M = 11.62,
SD= 7.71) and, as would be expected, far more errors were made
on antisaccade trials (M = 19.93, SD= 10.62) vs. prosaccade tri-
als (M = 5.68, SD= 4.83). The Task× Load interaction was not
signiﬁcant (F < 1).
There was no main effect of Group or interaction with
Load (F ’s< 1). Furthermore, Task×Group did not interact
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[F(1,32)= 1.57, p> 0.2], and there was no three-way interac-
tion [F(1,32)= 1.68, p> 0.2]. Scores or state anxiety correlated
with errors committed under high or low load in either anti- or
prosaccade tasks (all r ’s< 0.1).
DISCUSSION
The present study establishes that both one’s dispositional sus-
ceptibility to CF and the situational cognitive load imposed on
task goals can additively increase the likelihood of distraction as
assessed by the antisaccade task. Both CFQ score and load caused
clear detrimental effects on antisaccade latency, while having no
effect on prosaccades, thus demonstrating that both measures
purely affected trials requiring inhibition. Importantly, we found
no evidence of a differential effect of load for low and high CFQ
scorers on latencies and this would suggest an additive, rather than
interactive, role of both these factors in distraction.
Our ﬁndings build uponprevious research in a number of ways.
To our knowledge, only one previous study has documented a rela-
tionship between CFQ score and lapses in overt attention (Larson
and Perry, 1999). Establishing this point is important consider-
ing that many previous laboratory investigations of CFQ score
do not always present visual displays for periods that preclude
eye-movements. Differences in overt attention might therefore
account for increased distractor processing in high CFQ scor-
ers. Additionally, this previous study on CFQ score and overt
attention had a number of methodological concerns, the most
pressing being long eye-movement latencies within a normal pop-
ulation of over 480ms on average for a reﬂexive prosaccade.
Unusually, this average is far longer than reported here or even
for latencies reported in clinical populations (e.g., Gooding and
Tallent, 2001). Moreover, the experiment had no counterbalanc-
ing of block order, with prosaccade blocks always ﬁrst, and this
could potentially interact with individual differences in the latter
condition (see Kane et al., 2001, for comment). Here, we distin-
guished between trials that were characterized by no saccades,
anticipatory saccades, and erroneous reﬂexive saccades, establish-
ing that CFQonly affected correct antisaccade latencies as opposed
to reﬂexive errors. This ﬁnding is comparable to other studies
investigating antisaccade differences within the general popula-
tion (e.g., trait anxiety; Derakshan et al., 2009), and contests the
point that CFQ is necessarily associated with overt attention as we
did not observe any effects on error rates. In other words, high
CFQ scorers were merely slower to disengage from the target on
an antisaccade trial, which possibly only reﬂects a lapse in covert
attention.
Additionally, our manipulation of load also slowed antisaccade
latencies while having no effect on prosaccade latencies. Previ-
ous manipulations of load in overt attention tasks have relied
upon concurrent n-back (Mitchell et al., 2002), mental arith-
metic (Roberts et al., 1994), or concurrent tapping at set intervals
(Stuyven et al., 2000). Roberts et al. (1994) presented numbers
which participants were required to add together mentally in sets
of ﬁve items,and so it is somewhat difﬁcult to operationalize effects
of load as every ﬁve sequences a load began from zero, while addi-
tionally numbers were given at no set interval by the experimenter
vocally, creating a possible experimenter bias in sequence timing
in the low load (repeat the number spoken by the experimenter)
and high load (add each number spoken) conditions. Tapping
load also has potential issues with participants timing saccades
to keypress metronome, evidenced by the ﬁnding that tapping
increases prosaccade as well as antisaccade latencies (Stuyven et al.,
2000). Here, our load manipulation appears a useful tool for
future research, avoiding the issue of keypresses by using audi-
tory responses. That said, our method of monitoring participants’
accuracy in the secondary task, with the experimenter prompting
volunteers when appropriate, could be improved upon in future
research, with the use of more quantitative methods registering
participant responses. It should be noted however that our pitch
discrimination of low,mid, and high tonesmay have been an effec-
tive load because it involved a spatial aspect of pitches relative to
one another. Indeed,n-back load also requires anunderstanding of
the spatial order of items, and so it is possible that cognitive load
only affects antisaccade and overt attention performance when
that load taxes the same sub-component of WM needed to per-
form a task (see Kim et al., 2005, for a similar argument on covert
attention).
The ﬁnding that load did not affect CFQ scorers differently
is particularly important to our understanding of daily life dis-
traction. As mentioned, if anything high CFQ scorers showed a
smaller increase in latencies under load than low scorers. That
said, CFQ scores signiﬁcantly predicted slower response laten-
cies under both low and high load alike. We suggest that CF may
cause an increased likelihood of lapses in attention, but that cog-
nitive load simply adds to this susceptibility by linearly decreasing
cognitive resources for all individuals equally. Considering that
a link between CFQ score and WM capacity has not been estab-
lished in previous studies, our ﬁndings suggest that CFQ scoremay
be associated with deﬁcits in cognitive efﬁciency (i.e., inhibition)
rather than a reduced capacity. Hence, cognitive load would act by
reducing the amount of available cognitive resources, but would
not interact with a factor like CFQ score, which instead reduces
the efﬁciency of cognitive resources in suppressing task-irrelevant
information.
The present study also measured levels of state anxiety, due to
conceptual concerns that state experiences of worry, and anxiety
during a demanding cognitive task could explain any observed
differences between low and high CF scorers. In contrast, our evi-
dence suggested that although state anxiety was associated with
antisaccade latency performance, CFQ was incrementally a much
strong predictor on performance. Furthermore, state anxiety did
not predict performance when the inﬂuence of CFQ score was
taken into account. Thus, our ﬁndings suggest that anxiety during
a difﬁcult cognitive task can predict performance, but this anxiety
is inherently explained by one’s self-perceptions of distractibil-
ity. It should be noted that we did not assess the relationship
between trait anxiety (sustained personality characteristics of anx-
iety) on CFQ score’s predictive power. Previous work has shown
that high trait anxious individuals exhibit larger costs on perfor-
mance under high cognitive load (Berggren et al., in press), and
also that trait anxiety score andCFQ score are positively correlated
(e.g., Smith et al., 1995). Thus, one might argue that trait anxiety
could account for some of the variance explained by CFQ score,
despite our evidence suggesting that CFQ scorers are no differently
affected inmagnitude by load. Future research would beneﬁt from
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more directly comparing these two personality factors together in
affecting lapses in overt attention.
As well as that high CFQ scorers did not show greater costs on
performance as load increased, it is also interesting to interpret
results that low scorers, while under both low and high load faster
than high scorers, did not show any reduced cost by cognitive load.
This ﬁnding has relevance to the study of individual risk percep-
tion in the context of increasingly demanding daily tasks. White
et al. (2004), for example, showed that while drivers agreed that
concurrently using a mobile phone was one of the riskiest activi-
ties one could engage in, they perceived their own personal risk of
an accident by doing this as less likely than for other people. This
optimism bias is clearly not supported in the present study, where
the addition of a demanding dual-task impaired performance at
a similar magnitude both for individuals who perceive themselves
as making few CF in daily life, and those who consider themselves
to commit many. An interesting avenue of future research would
be to examine more closely the relationship between individuals’
risk perception and their ability to perform a task under varying
cognitive demands, such as within a driving simulator.
In summary, both self-reported CF in daily life and cognitive
load predict performance in overt attention and the ability to
ignore distraction. The contributions of both these internal and
external factors appear to cumulatively govern the likelihood of
focused attention and cognitive efﬁciency.
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